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Ihere is, within the (rapidly-
growing) community of people who
spend their time thinking about law
and policy in cyberspace, a rather inter-
esting debate taking place. Though it is
not always characterized in these
terms, it reflects a conflict between
competing visions of "order" and "disor-
der" in social systems. This is by no
means a "new" debate, but it takes on a
new shape in the rather special condi-
tions of cyberspace-or so, at least, I
hope to suggest in what follows.
TNKp- rcJdr!rt
Last January, Professor Tom Field of
the Franklin Pierce Law Center
(FPLC), posted the following message




Assuming that this message isn't screened out
by the [the server at the University of Texas
that hosts the Cyberprof discussion group],
you might be interested in a "small" problem
FPLC faces. A few weeks ago, someone
"bounced" some spam off our server. It some-
how corrupted our email system, and [now] I
am beginning to get messages like this:
The message that you sent was undeliv-
erable to the following: ipww@ljx.com
Transcript of session follows: AL4IL
FROM: tfield@fplc.edu refused; see
http://maps.vix.com/rbl/
I hope it never happens to you. Meanwhile,
any ideas about how to deal with it?
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The Explanation
There were, as it turned out, lots of ideas about how to
deal with it - but that is getting ahead of myself. First,
the facts, as best one can make them out here. Professor
Field ("tfield@fplc.edu") had sent an e-mail message to an
address at ljx.com. But the ljx.com e-mail server had
refused to deliver the message to the intended recipient
("Mail From: tfield@fplc.edu refused") and returned it
"undelivered" to Professor Field. What had happened?
Why had it done so?
The explanation is provided-elliptically, to be sure-
by the hyperlink reference ("see http://maps.vix.com/rbl")
in the message that Professor Field had received. If you
do indeed "see http://maps.vix.com/rbl" you are taken to
the home page of something called the Mail Abuse
Prevention System (MAPS). MAPS, the primary focus of
this tale, is a California non-profit limited liability com-
pany. 3 It coordinates a kind of group boycott by Internet
service providers (ISPs) for the purpose of reducing the
flow of what is commonly called "spam"- unsolicited
bulk e-mail. It operates, roughly, as follows. 4 The man-
agers of MAPS create and maintain what they call the
"Realtime Blackhole List" (RBL), which consists of a long
list of Internet addresses. 5 They place on the RBL any
Internet address from which, to their knowledge, spam
has originated. 6 They also place on the RBL the address
of any network that allows "open-mail relay"7 or pro-
vides "spam support services."8
MAPS makes the RBL list available to ISPs and other
network administrators on a subscription basis.9 ISPs
that subscribe to the RBL can, if they choose, set their
mail handlers to delete all e-mail originating from,
and/or going to, an address appearing on the list. That
is, when an RBL-subscribing ISP receives a request to
transmit e-mail to or from a subscriber, it checks the
sender's numeric Internet address against the list of
blackholed Internet addresses; if it finds a match, it
deletes the message. The blackholed address thus, in a
sense, disappears from the Internet as far as the sub-
scribing ISP (and its customers) are concerned.
Apparently, Professor Field's network-fplc.edu-had
been placed on the RBL-"blackholed -and ljx.com, the
home server of the intended recipient of Professor Field's
e-mail, was an RBL subscriber. When the ljx.com mail
server received Professor Field's message, it recognized
the e-mail as originating from a blackholed address and
deleted it, helpfully sending back the message, repro-
duced above, to Professor Field to inform him what was
going on.
The Question
What are we to make of things like the RBL? Here we
have a problem-the proliferation of unsolicited mass e-
mailing operations-that is, we might agree, a serious, or
at least a non-trivial, one. At just the moment that e-
mail has become an indispensable form of communica-
tion, of incalculable commercial and non-commercial
importance for a substantial and ever-growing segment
of the world community, its value is being undermined by
a barrage of unwanted and unsolicited communica-
tions. 10 But is the RBL a reasonable means of address-
ing this problem? To what extent can we, and should we,
rely on things like the RBL to devise a "solution" (howev-
er we might define a solution) to that problem?
The Debate
The question is, I think, both an interesting and an
important one. Legal scholars have recently discov-
ered-or re-discovered-the important role played by
informal systems of decentralized, consensus-based
social control in shaping human social behavior.1 1 It is
becoming increasingly clear that systems of rules and
sanctions created and administered without reliance on
State "authority," and outside of any formal State-man-
aged process-"norms-are powerful determinants of
behavior in many contexts. And what is the RBL if not a
textbook example of an informal, decentralized, norm-
creation process? The MAPS operators propose a norm,
a description of behavior that they consider, for whatev-
er reason, unacceptable-allowing open mail relay sys-
tems, for example, or providing "spam support ser-
vices. '"12 They offer to serve as your agent-or, more
accurately, as the agent for your network administrator
or ISP-in identifying those who are violating this norm.
They offer to keep you informed of those identifications
(via the RBL). They propose to sanction norm-violators.
The sanction they have in mind is the Ur-Sanction of
informal social control processes: shunning. Those who
choose to apply the sanction simply turn their backs on
offenders, ceasing all (electronic) communication with
them. MAPS helpfully provides you with the means
to accomplish this sanction-software that will con-
figure your system to delete e-mail to or from black-
holed addresses.
13
This is not, as it were, your father's norm-creation
process; it has some unusual features missing from real-
space norm-creation processes. 14 But it is norm-creation;
whether or not it can helpfully be described as "bottom-
up,"15 it is surely both "informal" and "decentralized."
Neither the decision to join (or not join) the group shun-
ning exercise (i.e., to subscribe to the RBL in the first
place), nor the shunning sanction imposed on violators of
the norm, relies on access to (formal) State-supported
enforcement devices or State-imposed legal sanctions,
1 6
and the decision whether to join that exercise is in the
hands of a (relatively large) number of independently-
acting agents.
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Conditions in cyberspace do seem to create, in
Professor Elkin-Koren's words, "new opportunities for
voluntary normative regimes" of this kind.18 Not sur-
prisingly, conflicts between formal and informal, central-
ized and decentralized, rule-making processes are at the
heart of many of the important and challenging cyber-
space policy debates. The extraordinary current turmoil
in the domain name allocation system is one illustration.
The story has been told in detail elsewhere. 1 9 Briefly, in
the beginning-before the Internet became such a Big
Deal-responsibility for operating the machines, and the
databases on those machines, that correctly route
Internet messages fell to the Internet Assigned Number
Authority (IANA), an imposing-sounding entity that, in
reality, consisted of a small number of dedicated volun-
teers in southern California. As the Internet began its
explosive growth, IANA's ability to maintain the system
became increasingly overloaded; beginning in 1993,
responsibility for maintaining these databases -at least,
for three of the increasingly popular "generic top-level"
domains--*.com, *.net, *.org and the like-was handed over
to a private firm, Network Solutions, Inc., under a contract-
styled a "Cooperative Agreement-funded by the U.S. gov-
ernment (first through the National Science Foundation,
later through the Commerce Department's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration).
When that cooperative agreement was due to expire in
1998, the Commerce Department had a decision to make.
It could simply walk away from the relationship on the
stated expiration date, which is ordinarily what happens
when cooperative agreements (or any government con-
tracts) expire. It rejected that option, however, taking
the position that it would be "irresponsible to withdraw
from its existing management role [in the domain name
system] without taking steps to ensure the stability of
the Internet. '20 The Internet naming system, it conclud-
ed, needed a "more formal and robust management struc-
ture," and it called for the creation of a new, not-for-prof-
it corporation formed by the "Internet stakeholders"
themselves to manage the domain name system.
2 1
Shortly thereafter, control of this system was placed in
the hands of a single institution - now known as
ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers-which would have overall responsibility
for setting the rules under which the domain name sys-
tem would henceforth operate. Putting aside whatever
one might think of this decision (or the manner in which
ICANN has fulfilled its responsibilities 2 2), the decision to
centralize authority over this system in a single, govern-
ment-authorized entity will inevitably have deep impli-
cations for the Internet as a whole.
The debate over the normative implications of these
informal processes has become a lively one indeed. In
one corner are commentators, myself included, who find
these systems normatively attractive, on both "legitima-
cy and "efficiency" grounds. 23 Legitimacy justifications
rest on the view that informal private ordering schemes
like the RBL are a "superior alternative to centralized
government models in that [they are] the most consistent
with autonomy and freedom."2 4 By these lights, MAPS is
normatively attractive inasmuch as it constrains individ-
uals' behavior only to the extent, and precisely to the
extent, that others share MAPS' views on the definition
of wrongdoing, the choice of appropriate sanction, the
identity of the wrongdoers, etc; the MAPS operators can
persuade, cajole, and beg the thousands of ISPs to sub-
scribe to the RBL, but they cannot force them to do so in
any meaningful sense of that term. Efficiency justifica-
tions rest on the extraordinary power of decentralized
systems to generate, by means of repeated trial-and-
error and the pull-and-tug of competing rules and
counter-rules, solutions to complex problems that can be
found no other way.
2 5
Others disagree, both with particular reference to
institutions like the RBL2 6 and in general, 2 7 arguing
both that the efficiency benefits of these cyberspace
norm-creation processes are overblown and that such
processes systematically exclude "public values" from
being incorporated into
the norms they generate.
It is a rich debate that
will, I suspect, be one of []"n|it bt
the enduring legacies of
the study of the law of
cyberspace. I want 
to put
aside, for purposes of this
essay, the many difficult, t l J e
even profound, substan-
tive questions raised in are at t
this debate, in order to
focus a little attention
instead on the meta- * 6 ]
debate, on questions




We like to think, at least at a conceptual level, that we
conduct this debate by placing decentralized rule-making
processes (like the RBL) on the table, dissecting their fea-
tures, and comparing them, on whatever normative or
descriptive criteria we choose, with alternative processes.
But there are serious impediments to our ability to do
that, impediments that skew the inquiry into the virtues
(or lack thereof) of decentralized processes. Let me try to
explain the sorts of things I have in mind.
First, I would suggest that we understand little-far
less than we need to--about the processes of self-ordering
and informal coordination. The rise of the Internet itself
shows us, I think, how little we know about the ways that
decentralized, trial-and-error, consensual processes can
build stable structures of literally unimaginable com-
plexity and power. If cyberspace did not exist, we would
all probably agree that it could not exist. How, after all,
would we go about building something as ridiculously
complex as a single interconnected global communica-
tions network? Who would we place in charge of such a
project? How would we solve the seemingly impossible
coordination problem facing anyone trying to construct
that global network-constructing, and getting large
numbers of people to adopt, what amounts to a single
global language?2 8
Of course, we did, somehow, solve it, without any
"authority" in charge of bringing it into being, in a
remarkably short period of time, and to the surprise of
virtually everyone. 2 9 A decentralized process of develop-
ing consensus among
larger and larger num-
bers of geographically-dis-
- f an persed individuals some-
how managed to get us
|ized an decen|-" here. Emergent institu-
tions like the Internet
Engineering Task Force 30
-i processes (whose motto, "We reject
Kings, Presidents, andE maly of t voting; we seek rough con-
sensus and working code,"
aptly captures its decen-
* ]tralized orientation), the
World Wide WebU- dbts Consortium 3i, the
Internet Assigned
Numbering Authority3 2 ,
and the like-institutions
with no authority whatsoever to act on anyone's behalf,
no fixed address or membership, no formal legal exis-
tence-somehow got hundreds of millions of individuals
across the globe to agree on a common syntax for their
electronic conversations. The protocols of the global net-
work, like the natural languages they so closely resem-
ble, emerged from a process that was at its core
unplanned and undirected. Though we can certainly
point ex post to many individuals and institutions who
played particularly important roles in its emergence, ex
ante there was no one we could have pointed to as
charged with "creating" the set of rules we now know as
the Internet, any more than we can point to any one indi-
vidual or institution charged with creating the set of
rules for English syntax.
Could it have been built any other way? My instinct is
that it could not have, that only an "authority-free"
ii
process of this kind could have constructed this system,
that no one with the authority to build the Internet could
have done so.3 3 If I'm right, this is of considerable impor-
tance to the normative debate, for it obliterates the dis-
tinction between the normative and the descriptive
aspects of the debate; if we were trying, circa 1965, to
find the "best" way of constructing the protocols for the
Internet, we would not lay alternative centralized and
decentralized decision-making models side-by-side for
comparison, for there would be no centralized model to
examine that could accomplish the task. But this is, I
admit, just instinct; I do not know of any analytic vocab-
ulary or framework within which I could make that argu-
ment. Even if my instinct is correct, how would we have
known that in 1965? How
would we know it now?
Second, and relatedly, I
believe that conditions in The d t
cyberspace make it diffi-
cult to specify the alterna- buil t
tive processes with which
decentralized processes t d a na
are to be compared as part
of this policy calculus. No
one, of course, suggests
that decentralized
processes like the one of
which the RBL is a part
constitute rule-making
Nirvana. The relevant
normative question is always whether processes of this
kind are better-however one chooses to define "better"-
than available alternatives.
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We need, in other words, to be debating whether the
process of which RBL is a part is better than-than
what? As I look over the contributions to this debate I'm
not always sure I can fill in that blank. Some of this is
mere rhetorical device; it is always tempting to seize the
rhetorical high ground by demonstrating the substantial
distance between an opponent's position and perfection
itself.3 5 But there is a deeper problem here. Cyberspace
is particularly, and genuinely, tricky on this score. What
are the alternative rule-making processes or institutions
that should be placed on the analytic table alongside the
RBL? The problems posed by the borderless features of
this new medium for traditional rule-making institu-
tions, faced with the problem of mapping territorially-
based legal regimes onto a medium in which physical
location is of little significance, have long since passed
into cliche; but that doesn't mean that they are not real
problems. Whose rules regarding spam should we be
comparing to MAPS'? The Virginia legislature's 36? The
United States Congress' 37? The International
Telecommunications Union's? UNESCO's? ICANN's?
The task of identifying the alternative rule-makers for
purposes of normative comparison is made even more dif-
ficult than this because cyberspace, having emerged from
decentralized disorder-from the primordial ooze of the
Internet Engineering Task Force - may well create con-
ditions that favor the growth of powerful centralizing
forces. 38 The State of Virginia will soon discover that its
anti-spam statute has little effect on the amount of spam
that its citizens receive,
because while spam origi-
nating anywhere on the
-, * rocess tha network can easily make
its way into Virginia,




I s t Virginia's control. 3 9 The
same will be true in-, regard to a federal anti-
spam statute (if such a
statute is enacted), just on
a grander scale. We can
already write the head-
line: "Use of Offshore E-Mail Servers Hinders
Enforcement of Federal Spam Statute; Government Calls
for International Cooperation to Solve 'Serious Problem."'
We will, inevitably (and, since we're on Internet Time,
sooner than we think), hear calls for "international har-
monization" of spam regulation, replicating the pattern
currently spreading across the cyberspace legal spec-
trum. How can we factor this into the normative com-
parisons we are trying to make?
Third and finally, if all this weren't confusing enough,
decentralized processes are fundamentally, and irre-
ducibly, unpredictable. No one can say ex ante what kind
of anti-spam rules will emerge from the RBL process, or
how the domain name allocation system would today be
operating had the Commerce Department chosen to step
aside in 1998, because that information does not exist
unless and until the process itself generates it. No one can
say whether MAPS' initiative will, or will not, cause open
mail relay systems to disappear, because that depends
upon the response of thousands of individual system
administrators; no one can say whether alternative and
as yet untried and perhaps unthought-of means of deter-
ring spammers will prove more popular than MAPS; no
one can say how spammers will react to the absence of
open-mail relay (or to these other alternatives) or how
the anti-spammers will react to those reactions, etc.
Because we can not see, or imagine, where the RBL
might take us-the rule(s) of spamming that the RBL
and its variants could produce-we cannot lay these
rules side-by-side with their centralized alternatives for
purposes of analysis, deliberation, and debate. Our ana-
lytic table contains only, as it were, the bad news: the
inherently disordered and aggravating messiness of
decentralized processes, mail that doesn't reach its
intended destination, disruptions of service, and the like.
It all makes for an apparently simple policy choice:
order versus chaos. During all of the discussions-which
can only be described as "frenzied"-leading up to the
decision to grant ICANN the authority to manage the
domain name system, I was continually struck by the
impossibility of discussing rationally the course of action
whereby the government would just walk away from the
entire thing. The Commerce Department set forth a
number of principles to guide its decision; the domain
name system should "support competition and consumer
choice," "reflect, as far as possible, the bottom-up gover-
nance that has characterized development of the Internet
to date," and "reflect the diversity of [the Internet's]
users and their needs" by "ensur[ing] international input
in decision making."40  But one principle was primus
inter pares:
The U.S. government should end its role in the
Internet number and name address systems in
a responsible manner. This means, above all
else, ensuring the stability of the Internet. The
Internet functions well today, but its current
technical management is probably not viable
over the long term. We should not wait for it to
break down before acting. Yet, we should not
move so quickly, or depart so radically from
the existing structures, that we disrupt the
functioning of the Internet. The introduction of
a new system should not disrupt current oper-
ations, or create competing root systems.
4 1
The decentralized process that built the Internet pro-
tocols and the domain name system cannot, ex ante,
"ensur[e] the stability of the Internet." If that is indeed
the goal, that option is off the table. Because there is no
way to answer the question "What kind of domain name
system would we have today had the Commerce
Department stepped aside in 1998?," that course of
action could not be taken seriously.
My fear is that this leads to a policy-making catastro-
phe of significant proportions. A "stable" Internet is one
locked in place, incapable of generating innovative
responses to the very problems that it is itself bringing
into existence. The very existence of the Internet should
caution us against dismissing too quickly the notion that
there are some problems that are best solved by these
messy, disordered, semi-chaotic, unplanned, decentral-
ized systems, and that the costs that necessarily accom-
pany such unplanned disorder may sometimes be worth
bearing. 42 But which problems? How can we know? *
Postd@erols.com: An earlier version of this paper was originally pre-
sented at the Yale Information Society Project Conference on "Private
Censorship/Perfect Choice," April 9, 1999. Thanks to Bill Scheinler for
research assistance, and to the Temple Law School summer research
grant fund for support in completing this paper.
1 Cyberprof is a listserve discussion group moderated by Professor
Mark Lemley of the University of California-Berkeley.
2 E-mail from Tom Field, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center, to
Cyberprof Discussion Group, Jan. 28, 1999 (thanks to Professor Field
for his permission to quote the message here) (copy on file with the
author).
3 See Robert McMillan, What Will Stop Spam? (last modified Nov.
20, 1999) <http://www.sunworld.com/sunworldonline/swol-12-
1997/swol-12-vixie.html>. See renerallv Mail Abuse Prevention
System (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://mail-abuse.org>; Maps Realtime
Blackhole List (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl>.
5 The RBL currently has approximately 1,400 entries. E-mail from
Nick Nicholas, Executive Director, Mail Abuse Prevention System, to
David G. Post (Oct. 6, 1999) (on file with author). Most of these
entries consist of only a single numeric Internet address; some, how-
ever, consist of the address of what is commonly called a "Class C"
network, which itself contains 255 individual addresses. See Paul
Vixie, AL4PS RBL Candidacy (visited Nov. 19, 1999)
<http://maps.vix.com/rbl/candidacy.html>.
6 See Vixie, supra note 5. Removal from the list requires a showing
by the blackholed address, or the appropriate network administrator,
that the spammer is no longer at the address in question and/or that
a stronger "Terms of Use" agreement has been put in place for the
network on which the spammer was located. Id.
4 See generally, Mail Abuse, supra note 3.
7 "Open-mail relay" refers to a practice whereby Internet mail
servers process and transmit e-mail messages in circumstances in
which neither the sender nor the recipient is an authenticated local
user; that is, it allows "strangers" to access its mail handling facilities.
Spammers, apparently, utilize open-mail relay sites to "launder" their
e-mail; by using an open relay, their e-mail will appear to have origi-
nated from a source other than the true source, thereby making it dif-
ficult to trace or filter the messages. See Better Network Security
Through Peer Pressure: Stopping Smurf and Spam (visited May 31,
1999) <http://securityportal.com/cover/coverstory19990531.html>; Paul
Hoffman, Allowing Relaying in SMTP: A Series of Surveys (visited
Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.imc.org/ube-relay.html>; Chip Rosenthal,
MAPS TSI Anti-Relay: What is Third-Party Mail Relay? (visited July
31, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/tsi/ar-what.html>; Vixie, supra note 5.
8 MAPS includes in this category such activities as hosting web
pages that are listed as destination addresses in bulk e-mail, or pro-
viding e-mail forwarders or auto-responders that can be used by bulk
e-mailers. See Vixie, supra note 5.
9 There is currently no charge to subscribe to the RBL. See Nick
Nicholas & Chip Rosenthal, MAPS RBL Participants (visited Nov. 19,
1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/participants.html>. The RBL currently
has over 180 registered subscribers who receive full, frequently updat-
ed copies of the RBL for storage and use on their own routers and
servers. These subscribers are required to execute a license agreement
with MAPS, the terms of which are not publicly available. Id. In
addition, there are "several thousand" other users who either receive
the RBL via "EBGP4 Multi-Hop," a protocol used by routers on the
Internet, or through direct queries on specific numeric Internet
address to MAPS' RBL servers. Id.
10 Some have suggested - plausibly - that the explosion of mass e-
mail is undermining the viability and even the existence of many open
discussion forums (in particular, many Usenet newsgroups) - one of
the Internet's earliest and most remarkable innovations. See Paul K.
Ohm, Comment, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, A Case Study, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1941, 1951 (1999) (noting that spam causes a dramatic
decrease in Usenet's "signal-to-noise" ratio and is therefore considered
a "major threat" to [Usenet's] continued popularity).
11 See generallv, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (arguably the start of the rejuve-
nation of the study of norms within legal scholarship.) The
Symposium on Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996), maps out much of the recent terrain.
12 MAPS provides an extensive rationale for its proposed norms.
See Paul Vixie, Our Rationale for the MAPS RBL (last modified July
12, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/rationale.html>.
13 The RBL has apparently become popular enough that many of the
vendors of the most popular mail server configuration software pro-
vide support for RBL implementation in their products. See Paul
Vixie, (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/usage.html>.
14 The implementation in software of this particular norm is surely
an unusual feature of this process that has no clear analogue in real-
space norm-creation schemes. Enforcement of norms by code is, as
Professor Lessig has demonstrated, a large, and a most fundamental
change. See LAwRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAwS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999). Cyberspace, in Lessig's words,
... demands a new understanding of how regulation
works and of what regulates life there. It compels us to
look beyond the traditional lawyer's scope - beyond
laws, regulations, and norms. ... In cyberspace we must
understand how code regulates - how the software and
hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyber-
space as it is. As William Mitchell puts it, this code is
cyberspace's "law." Code is law.
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
15 Margaret Radin and R. Polk Wagner criticize what they describe
as a "false dichotomy" between characterizations of "top-down" and
"bottom-up" ordering. See Margaret Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1998). Any rule-making regime,
they suggest, "can be characterized as either [top-down or bottom-up],
depending upon how you look at it." Id. at 1298. The point is an
important one; rule-making processes are always top-down when seen
from one level of the hierarchy of social institutions and bottom-up
when seen from a different level. MAPS's decision-making process is
top-down from the perspective of, say, the MAPS webmaster, who
receives from " higher up" a list of sites to put on, or take off, the RBL
each morning. This top-down process is simultaneously a component
of a bottom-up process from the perspective of someone looking at the
responses of the Internet community as a whole to the proliferation of
commercial e-mail. This is a feature of all networks (including social
networks) consisting of embedded hierarchies; any element in the net-
work is simultaneously at the top of some hierarchy(ies) and at the
bottom of others. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is
the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal
Systems, 29 J.L.S. 545 (2000) (describing this "dizzying" characteristic
of embedded hierarchies as a consequence of their fractal structure).
16 You are not, in other words, subject to any sanction enforced
through the formal State-created processes if you choose to join, or not
to join, the MAPS exercise. If for any reason you do not approve of
MAPS' particular definition of unacceptable behavior, their choice of
sanction, the means they have chosen to implement that sanction, or
their method of detecting violators subject to the sanction, you can
ignore them (or, if you'd like, to propose your own). MAPS can per-
suade, cajole, and beg the thousands of ISPs out there to join the
group of RBL subscribers, but it cannot use State-sanctioned force to
get them to do so.
17 Professor Elkin-Koren defines "decentralized" norm-creation
processes as those in which the "power to create and shape ... rules
is not concentrated in the hands of any individual group, or institu-
tion [and which is] spread among various social agents." Niva Elkin-
Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1998). As of June, 1999, there were over
6,000 ISPs in the United States alone offering Internet connectivity,
See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet, FCC
Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 31 (last modified July,
1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l.pdf>, and
countless other network administrators in a position to subscribe (or
not) to the RBL.
18 Elkin-Koren, supra note 17, at 1161-62 (Cyberspace "significantly
reduces the costs of communicating and collecting information regard-
ing individuals' preferences. It also facilitates fast and cost-effective
information processing that allows real-time feedback on public pref-
erences and choices. Cyberspace, thus, opens up opportunities for
effective participation of individuals in defining the rules.").
19 See A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617 (1999); Milton L. Mueller, Internet Domain
Names: Privatization, Competition, and Freedom of Expression, Cato
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